The researchers go on to demonstrate that the discrepant predictions change the theoretical implications of prior research. Key concepts include Pooling behavior in which firms make the same choice regardless of their market prospects was widespread among experimental participants relative to separating behavior in which firms make the distinct choices based on their market prospects. Participants were more than three times more likely to pool than to separate.
Pooling behaviors were especially common among participants who reported a high level of understanding of the experimental setting and the degree of pooling increased in Chinese Overseas America Number Data later rounds of the experiment. Participants who made pooling decisions were rewarded by participants playing the role of an external investor and earned significantly more in the experimental market than participants who made separating decisions. Leveraging the behavioral insight that real decision makers will pool under certain circumstances can materially affect the implications of existing operations theory. Author Abstract We explore how individuals make decisions in an operations management setting when there is information asymmetry between the firm and an outside investor.
A common assumption in the signaling game literature is that beliefs among the participants in the game are refined using the Intuitive Criterion refinement. that the predictive power of this refinement is quite low and that the Undefeated refinement better captures actual choice behavior. This is surprising because the Intuitive Criterion refinement is the most commonly utilized belief refinement in the literature while the Undefeated refinement is rarely employed.